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TO RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO BRUSSELS BE IMMEDIATE
INFO RUCNCFE/CONVENTIONAL ARMED FORCES IN EUROPE COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RIGA 000560

SIPDIS

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TAGS: PARM PREL KCFE LG EN LH
SUBJECT: OUTCOMES - U.S.-BALTIC CFE CONSULTATIONS

REF: A. (A) STATE 66678 - JUN 24 HLTF GUIDANCE
1B. (B) STATE 28933 - NAC STATEMENT ON CFE TREATY
1C. (C) USNATO 236 - JUN 24 HLTF REPORTING CABLE
1D. (D) STATE 83574 - READOUT OF A/S FRIED'S
BRIEFING TO NATO AMBASSADORS ON HIS JULY
29 CFE MEETING WITH MFA DIRECTOR ANTONOV
1E. (E) STATE 89769 - GEORGIA CONFLICT:SHAPING
FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT
1F. (F) STATE 96113 - GUIDANCE FOR SEPT 11 HLTF
MEETING AND SEP 8-9 CONSULTATIONS WITH
BALTIC STATE

Classified By: Ambassador Charles W. Larson Jr. for reason 1.4 (b) and (d)

11. (C) SUMMARY: The three Baltic states used annual CFE and conventional arms control consultations with the U.S. HLTF delegation on September 8-9 to underscore the need for increased cooperation on NATO defense planning in light of Russia's actions in Georgia. Far from fixated on notions of developing Article 5 contingency plans, the Baltics called instead for Allied engagement on Baltic defense needs, a recognition of their exposed position, and a serious NATO planning process similar to U.S. mil-mil engagement with them over the past year. The Latvian host (Kaspars Ozolins) indicated in a private bilateral session that such engagement is necessary to make it possible for Latvia to maintain its focus on expeditionary capabilities against a backdrop of public and Parliamentary pressure deriving from their concerns about Russian intentions. Representatives of all three Baltic states:

-- were relieved that the U.S. was not prepared to move forward with further engagement with Russia on CFE via the Fried-Antonov channel until the situation in Georgia improved significantly;

-- agreed that NATO should consider CFE options for responding to Russia's actions in Georgia and send a signal that NATO will not do business as usual;

-- emphasized that Allies' unambiguous priority should be to maintain Alliance unity;

-- repeatedly cited the U.S.-Baltic CFE consultative process - which involved discussions on Russian and Belarusian forces in the region, political consultations on objectives for CFE and related issues, and, most importantly, EUCOM engagement on defense planning - as a model for the type of NATO-based effort that would help address their security concerns about the "new" Russia.

12. (U) The U.S. delegation, led by STATE/VCI DAS Karin L. Look, included Jennifer Laurendeau, Jeffrey Gibbs, Kathryn Ducceschi, and Jim Starkey from State Department; Peter Perenyi and LtCol Anne Marie Fenton from OSD Policy; and Ann Mason (Emb Riga), Doug Hoyt (Emb Vilnius) and Alamanda

Importance of CFE and the Impact of Russian Actions in Georgia

13. (C) All three Baltic delegations stressed the importance they attach to CFE as an instrument for building security and confidence. They emphasized that entry into force of a/CFE and eventual accession remained in the interest of Baltic security. They stressed that Alliance unity - and U.S. leadership - in the face of Russian suspension has been key to successfully managing the CFE impasse over the past nine months and agreed with the U.S. that Alliance solidarity is critical to maintain considering the situation in Georgia. They agreed with the U.S. that Russian military action in Georgia violated core principles on which CFE is based including the principle of host nation consent to the presence of foreign forces. They welcomed the U.S. idea that Allies should discuss CFE options for responding to Russia,s actions which Look outlined per reftel.

14. (C) All three Baltic reps were relieved that the U.S. was not prepared to move forward with further engagement with Russia on CFE via the Fried-Antonov channel until the situation in Georgia improved significantly, and supported the idea of a NATO statement to this effect. As far as the Medvedev European security proposal, there was consensus that Allies should not engage on any new regional proposals that could undermine existing European security structures, including the Alliance, or existing agreements, like CFE. Regarding any actions specific to the CFE Treaty, each remarked they were in favor of concrete actions that clearly

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demonstrated a "not business as usual" approach, but none felt in a position to elaborate as they are not States Parties. The repeated message each delivered was that the unambiguous priority should remain maintaining Alliance unity.

Security Situation Update

15. (C) Opposite the Baltic States: The U.S. del provided an update - as per usual practice - on the security situation in the Baltic region to include the status of Russian forces in the Leningrad Military District and the Kaliningrad Oblast, as well as forces in Belarus. During the past year there have been further eliminations of inactive units in the Leningrad Military District. Russia's apparent focus with respect to land forces has been on smaller, better trained active forces with a notable emphasis on those in the south while air forces have seen no change in structure but emphasis on training. Latvia noted the increased training included larger scale exercises across military districts. Lithuania stressed the need to consider both the political and tactical rationale behind Russian force posture in particular during the defense planning process.

16. (C) Georgia: In response to a specific request from the Baltic states to include a discussion of Russian forces in the southern part of the flank area, the U.S. del provided a preliminary overview of the Georgia-Russia military conflict noting the effective planning, quick reaction and successful execution of the Russian forces in a short-distance, rapid deployment. Latvia, characterizing Russia,s attack as "depressing" due to the force volume and effectiveness, questioned how CFE mechanisms and Russia,s "suspension" applied especially as regards Russian violations and, on a broader level, the linkage to the Sarkozy 6-point cease fire plan.

17. (C) Regarding CFE mechanisms on a practical level, the U.S. del noted that Russia,s actions resulted in an

increased coverage of equipment in the revised flank area, where holdings already exceeded Treaty limits, and that had Allies been able to carry out inspections it would have been possible to gain some additional information on the forces that had deployed. Most importantly, Russia's response was not only disproportionate, but also a clear violation of CFE host nation consent and Georgia's territorial integrity, a principle which underpins the CFE Treaty regime and has broader implications as far as implementation of the cease fire plan and the future status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

Louder Call for Expanded Defense Planning

¶8. (C) Latvia noted that current situation with CFE would need to be viewed through both a Georgia "prism" and one of an Allied approach to defense planning. On the eve of their 16-18 September Riga planning meeting with EUCOM, the Baltic states expressed appreciation with EUCOM's efforts to date, which were initiated by OSD at the State Department's request following last year's CFE consultations in Vilnius. All - particularly the Latvians - said that NATO engagement on defense planning was more important than the specific idea of developing contingency plans. They cited EUCOM consultations on defense planning in the CFE context, if replicated with the military planning structures at NATO, as an example of a concrete and visible step that would help address their broader concerns about managing Russian pressure. DAS Look observed that aside from the original issue of setting CFE limits EUCOM's planning effort was useful in its own right in the context of the current situation.

¶9. (U) Delegation Lists:

Latvia: Mr Kaspars Ozoli, Head of Delegation, Director of Security Policy Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA); Mr Raimonds Okalns, Head of Arms Control Division, MFA; Mr Juris Pkalis, Head of NATO and European Security Policy Division, MFA; Ms Dina Krieva, 2nd Secretary, Arms Control Division, MFA; Mr Andejs Viumsons, Deputy Head of Mission, Mission of Latvia to NATO; Ms Ieva Jirgensone, 2nd Secretary, Mission of Latvia to NATO; Mr Jnis Garisons, Director of Crisis Management Department, MOD; Ms Ginta Brmane, Senior Desk Officer of the Defence Policy and Strategy Section, MOD; Mr Normunds Daivis, Military Intelligence Service; Mr Lauris Kalni, Military Intelligence Service

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Lithuania: Mr Robertas Rosinas, Head of Delegation, Head of Arms Control and Terrorism Prevention Division, MFA; Ms Migl Budryt, Acting Director of International Relations and Operations Department, MOD; Major Darius Baranauskas, Deputy Chief of Arms Control Section, Lithuanian Armed Forces; Ms Egl Morknait, 3rd Secretary, Arms Control and Terrorism Prevention Division, MFA

Estonia: Mr Margus Kolga, Head of Delegation, Director General, First Political Department, MFA; Mr Christian-Marc Liflnder, Director, Policy Planning Department, MOD; Mr Kristjan Prikk, Director, International Cooperation Department, MOD; Mr Arti Hilpus, Director, Security Policy Division, MFA; Ms Kaili Terras, Desk Officer, Security Policy Division, MFA; Major Sten Allik, Analysis and Planning Department, Estonian Defense Forces Headquarters
LARSON